“The adversary suffers when every path they take ends in a trap.”
Organizations must continually enumerate the attack paths created by both exposed and isolated platform elements, and work towards platform deception techniques.
Module 04 covers Function FOUR, Incident Response Preparation. Below: where the learner begins (what F03 and earlier produced), the work this module performs, and where the learner ends.
A complete F01 CONOPS, F02 threat catalogue, and F03 attack-path map. No detection signatures or validated data sources yet; coverage of the attack-path map is unknown.
Enumerated data and signal sources for every step of every attack path, plus a complete portfolio of detection signatures in RootA.io format. Each AN-DET attaches via TDM to the structural element it observes and back-references the AN-ATT it covers. Ready for F05 (Module 05) to enumerate resilience measures that remove adversary attack surface.
Module 04 hands-on objectives. Each row maps a LABS component to its KSAT type, (L)EARN to Knowledge, (A)PPLY to Skill, (B)UILD to Ability, (S)IMULATE to Task, so the exam at the end of the module assesses the same competencies the labs build.
| LABS Component | KSAT Type | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| (L)EARN | Knowledge | Knowledge of RootA.io as the open, vendor-neutral detection language; the TDM (Target of Detection Method) attachment field; and the discipline that no orphan signatures are accepted. |
| (L)EARN | Knowledge | Knowledge of detection-gap elements as first-class analytic products that drive engineering work to close telemetry gaps before signature publication. |
| (A)PPLY | Skill | Skill in inventorying available telemetry per structural element, logs, traces, RF, signal feeds, mission product feeds, and validating that data sources are reachable and have acceptable quality. |
| (A)PPLY | Skill | Skill in writing AN-DET signatures in RootA.io format with TDM attachments and back-references to the AN-ATT, AN-IOA, or AN-THR each detects. |
| (B)UILD | Ability | Ability to validate every required data source BEFORE signature publication, capturing detection-gap elements where telemetry does not exist. |
| (S)IMULATE | Task | Produce a complete AN-DET portfolio for a sample LEO platform with measurable coverage of the F03 attack-path map and a documented detection-gap backlog. |
Function Four elements detection coverage: AN-DET signatures expressed in RootA. Every AN-DET entry attaches via TDM (not TOE) to the structural elements it observes. A threat or attack path with no matching AN-DET becomes a first-class detection-gap element, an analytic product in its own right.
RootA-wrapped detection signatures, each citing the AN-IOC/IOA/ATT/THR entries it provides coverage for.
Every AN-DET names the structural entries (AST, SVC, SEG) the signature observes.
Each threat or attack path without an AN-DET becomes a queryable gap element, a first-class output of the framework.
Function Four elements detection coverage: AN-DET signatures expressed in RootA. Every AN-DET entry attaches via TDM (not TOE) to the structural elements it observes. A threat or attack path with no matching AN-DET becomes a first-class detection-gap element, an analytic product in its own right.
AN-IOC, AN-IOA, AN-ATT, and AN-THR elements from Modules 2 and 3.
AN-DET entries, RootA-wrapped detection signatures attached via TDM to the structural entries they observe.
Function FOUR attaches its work to the structural decomposition produced upstream, the AN-ATT attack-path map. Every AN-DET you enumerate in this module attaches via TDM to one or more structural elements. Quick recap of the four structural layers and the analytic overlay.
PCEPrimary Capability EnvironmentWhere the platform physically operates. Five environments: Terrestrial, Aquatic, Aerial, Orbital, Deep Space.
SEGSegmentSelf-contained piece with a specific operational role. Ten segments including Launch, Link, Ground, User, Space, Deep Space.
SVCServiceThe functional plane, how a segment controls things or moves data. Three services: Control Plane, Data Plane, Hybrid.
ASTAssetConcrete things that make a service work. Six asset classes: Hardware, Firmware, Software, Data, Signal, Hybrid.
ANAnalytic (this module's home)A separate overlay layer. Carries what defenders observe and build. Six categories, AN-DET is the one this module produces.
Same AN-DET two ways. The taxonomy element is the abstract category, written hyphenated as AN-DET. The enumerated element is one specific instance on your platform, written with all five fields plus a description, e.g. AN: DET: Detection Signature: 00. Use the hyphenated form when you mean “any Detection Signature”; use the full form when you mean “this exact Detection Signature on our platform.”
The category. Written LAYER-ELEMENT (hyphenated). Use it in prose to refer to any Detection Signature.
AN-DET
“Every AN-DET entry must have a documented source.”, talking about detection signatures in general.
AN-DET
“Our AN-DET catalogue is reviewed quarterly against intel updates.”
One specific instance. Written LAYER: ELEMENT: LABEL: ORDINAL with description and TDM.
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 00
“AN: DET: 00, RootA.io Signature for Anomalous Command Pattern”
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 01
A second specific detection signature on the same platform, same taxonomy code, different ordinal, different description and TDM.
Each AN-DET enumerated element points back at the platform via the TDM (Target of Detection Method) field. TDM names the structural element the detection observes. Without TDM, detection signatures are free-floating noise, the structural anchor is what makes the detection signature actionable, queryable, and shareable.
Each AN-DET element carries a TDM field that lists the structural element(s) the detection signature structural element the detection observes. Format: TDM: structural element references.
AN: DET: 00, RootA.io Signature for Anomalous Command Pattern: TDM: TDM: AST: SW: Software: 03. Every structural anchor is a real enumerated element on the platform, never a hypothetical, never a sample.
An AN-DET with no TDM attachment is free-floating noise. Every entry must point at one or more real structural elements on your platform. This is the discipline that keeps the analytic catalogue queryable, correlatable, and shareable.
Per-element enumeration procedure. The walk is the same for every AN-DET; only the inputs and the structural anchors change. Sources: the AN-ATT attack-path map.
01020304050601 · PICK AN AN-ATT STEP
Walk the F03 attack-path map. Each step (TOE element) is a candidate detection point.
02 · INVENTORY REQUIRED TELEMETRY
What data or signal source would surface adversary activity at this step? Logs, traces, RF telemetry, signal feeds, mission product feeds.
03 · VALIDATE THE SOURCE EXISTS
Confirm the data is reaching the SOC, has acceptable quality, is queryable. If not, capture as a detection-gap element, engineering work.
04 · WRITE THE ROOTA.IO RULE
Express the detection logic in RootA.io format. Vendor-specific queries without RootA.io wrapper are not accepted as AN-DET.
05 · ATTACH VIA TDM
AN-DET attaches via TDM (Target of Detection Method, not TOE) to the structural element it observes. Back-reference the AN-ATT it covers.
06 · MEASURE COVERAGE
For every AN-ATT, count the AN-DET signatures detecting it. Identify gaps and consolidate redundant signatures.
A real-world detection signature for an orbital constellation, end-to-end, the enumerated element, the TDM attachment, the sourcing, and how it hands off to the next function.
Detection signature back-referencing AN: ATT: 00. Watches AST: SW: Software: 03 for anomalous command injection patterns. Tested with FP rate < 1%.
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 00
TDM: TDM: AST: SW: Software: 03Driven by AN: ATT: 00; data source onboarded and validated 2026-Q2; RootA.io rule reviewed by detection engineering
Real-world validated only. No hypotheticals. The sourcing trail makes the entry auditable and lets analysts revisit when intel evolves.
F05 enumerates AN-RES resilience measures to remove adversary attack surface.
F05 (Adversary Management), enumerates AN-RES resilience measures targeting structural elements that recur across F02 threats and F03 attack paths.
Before publishing an AN-DET to your TIP or sharing through Space ISAC, verify:
An enumerated AN-DET carries five core fields plus the TDM (Target of Detection Method) attachment that makes it actionable. Cycle through each below to see what the field holds, what a real value looks like, and where learners typically slip.
LAYERField 1 of 5Fixed for every analytic-layer entry.
AN
ELEMENTField 2 of 5Two-letter taxonomy code identifying the signature sub-category.
DET
LABELField 3 of 5Plain-English name for the DET code.
Detection Signature
ORDINALField 4 of 5Two-digit serial; first signature published is 00.
00
DESCRIPTIONField 5 of 5Free-text scoping with the rule's purpose, back-reference, and operational metrics.
"RootA.io rule for anomalous command-injection pattern; back-references AN: ATT: 00; FP rate < 1%."
TDMTDM attachment (AN-specific)TDM (Target of Detection Method), the structural element the signature observes. Distinct from TOE (what adversaries exploit).
TDM: AST: SW: Software: 03
Four worked AN-DET enumerations spanning different scenarios on the same LEO platform, nation-state, supply chain, RF, insider. Each one is real-world validated, structurally anchored via TDM, and traceable to its source.
Detects anomalous command-injection patterns on the ground software. Tested under operational load.
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 00
TDM: AST: SW: Software: 03
Sourcing: Back-references AN: ATT: 00; data source onboarded 2026-Q2; FP < 1%
Watches for unexpected firmware checksum changes mid-mission. Pairs with offline attestation review.
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 01
TDM: AST: FW: Firmware: 00
Sourcing: Back-references AN: ATT: 01; firmware-attestation feed validated 2026-Q2
Detects deviation from baseline uplink RF spectrum during nominal commanding windows.
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 02
TDM: AST: SI: Signal: 00
Sourcing: Back-references AN: ATT: 02; SDR feed validated 2026-Q1
Watches for privileged operator authentications outside scheduled mission ops windows.
AN: DET: Detection Signature: 03
TDM: SVC: CP: Control Plane: 00
Sourcing: Back-references AN: ATT: 03; SIEM feed validated 2026-Q1
AN-DET · the coverage statementPattern, signal, or logic that triggers on contextualized threat behavior, expressed in RootA format.
| LAYER | ELEMENT | LABEL | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|---|
AN | DET | Detection Signature | Pattern, signal, or logic that triggers on contextualized threat behavior, expressed in RootA format. |
TDMTarget of Detection Method, lists the structural entries the signature is designed to observe. AN-DET is unique, it uses TDM, not TOE.
Sourcing: Internal detection engineering, vendor-published rules wrapped into RootA, and peer-shared detections. Vendor-specific queries without a RootA wrapper are not accepted.
A threat or attack path with no matching detection signature is not an oversight, it is an enumerated analytic product. The absence becomes a first-class element in the taxonomy, turning detection-gap identification from ad-hoc review into a structured, queryable output of the framework. Every AN-DET entry must be wrapped in RootA so it translates to any participating SOC’s native query language.
LAYER = AN (fixed).
The signature must be expressed in RootA. A vendor-specific query without a RootA wrapper is not accepted as an AN-DET entry.
Identifies this as a Detection-Signature entry within the Analytic Layer.
Two-digit, AN-DET-00, AN-DET-01, …
List the structural entries the signature is designed to observe. AN-DET uses TDM (Target of Detection Method), not TOE.
Identify what the signature looks for and the AN-IOC, AN-IOA, AN-ATT, or AN-THR entries it covers. Cite the RootA rule and source.
Module 05 enumerates AN-RES resilience measures that remove adversary attack surface across the structural elements where threats and attack paths recur.
A multiple-choice exam aligned with Module 04 KSAT areas. Drawn at random from a question bank covering Function FOUR's taxonomy element (AN-DET), its TARGET attachment (TDM), and the production flow into the next function. Exam scaffolding wired in next iteration.
20 questions, drawn at random from a 20-question bank, aligned with Module 04 KSAT areas: Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Tasks. Question and answer order are randomized each session.